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Abstract 
Efficient error-Propagating Block Chaining (EPBC) is a 
block cipher mode intended to simultaneously provide 
both confidentiality and integrity protection for messages. 
Mitchell pointed out a weakness in EPBC and claimed 
that this permits a forgery attack. This paper corrects a 
flaw in Mitchell’s analysis and shows that the attack is no 
better than brute force of the integrity check vector. 
Keywords:  block cipher, authenticated encryption, EPBC, 
forgery attack. 
1 Introduction 
Efficient error-Propagating Block Chaining (EPBC) 
(Zuquete and Guedes 1997) is a mode of operation for 
block ciphers that is intended to provide authenticated 
encryption (AE). EPBC can be used with any block 
cipher. The plaintext is divided into blocks as defined by 
the selected block cipher. A predefined Integrity Check 
Vector (ICV) is appended to the plaintext message and 
the message is then encrypted in EPBC mode. When the 
ciphertext is decrypted, the receiver checks the 
correctness of ICV. Any change to the ciphertext should 
propagate erroneous decryptions to all subsequent 
ciphertext blocks, resulting in the decryption to an 
incorrect ICV (Zuquete and Guedes 1997), as shown in 
Figure 1. Messages with an incorrect ICV are rejected by 
the receiver. 
 
Figure 1: Integrity mechanism (Recacha 1996) 
    Recently, Mitchell analysed EPBC, pointing out a 
weakness in the integrity mechanism and proposed a 
forgery attack based on this weakness (Mitchell 2007). 
He claimed that knowing sufficient plaintext/ciphertext 
pairs permitted the inner vectors, used to conceal 
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plaintext patterns, to be disclosed with very high 
probability. Once these inner vectors were known, a 
forgery could be constructed. However, we show that his 
calculation is inaccurate, and the probability of a 
successful forgery is no better than that of guessing the 
ICV.  
2 Description of EPBC 
EPBC is a mode of operation for an n -bit block cipher, 
for even n , say 2n m . Two secret keys denoted K and
'K are used. One key, K , is used for encryption and 
decryption. Let  Ke P  denote the encryption of the 
plaintext block P and  Kd C  denote the decryption of 
the ciphertext blockC under the key K . The second 
secret key, 'K , and a sequence number S are used to 
generate a pair of secret n -bit initial vectors denoted by 
0F and 0G , where  '0 KF e S  and  '0 0KG e F , which 
are used for encryption and decryption of the first block. 
    The EPBC encryption operation is defined as follows:  
1i i iG P F  , 1 i u  , 
 i K iF e G ,1 i u   , 
 1i i iC F g G   , 2 i u  , 
where 
1 1 0C F G   and g  is a function applied to the two 
m -bit halves of the n -bit block. More precisely, suppose 
X  is an n -bit block, where X L R , L is the high 
order m -bit block and R is the low order m -bit block (
denotes concatenation). Then g is defined as follows: 
     g X L R L R    
where and denote the bitwise inclusive or and logical 
and operations respectively, and X denotes the bitwise 
inverse version of X .This process is shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: EPBC encryption (Mitchell 2007) 
    The decryption operation is simply a reverse process of 
the encryption as follows: 
 1i i iF C g G   , 2 i u  , 
 i K iG d F ,1 i u   , 
1i i iP G F  ,1 i u  . 
where 
1 1 0F C G  . 
    Verifying the integrity is done simply by checking the 
last l bits of recovered plaintext (where l is the length of 
the ICV). If this matches the expected value of the ICV, 
the message is regarded as authentic.  
3 Review of Mitchell’s analysis 
Mitchell’s forgery attack (Mitchell 2007) on EPBC aims 
to forge a ciphertext in such a way that the forgery is not 
detected by the integrity mechanism. This is an existential 
forgery (Preneel 1998). In order to achieve this, the 
attacker has to construct a message such that the last 
ciphertext block will decrypt to the correct ICV value. 
The inner vectors, 
iF and iG , in EPBC ensure the integrity 
protection by propagating inaccurate decryptions from 
any tampered ciphertext blocks through to the end 
(Zuquete and Guedes 1997). Zuquete and Guedes (1997) 
note that the forged ciphertext blocks must be constructed 
to adjust values of the inner vectors during the decryption 
process, to permit correct decryption of the ICV. 
    The function g  in EPBC is critical in protecting the 
contents of the inner vectors from discovery. Mitchell’s 
analysis is composed of two stages: investigating a 
vulnerability of the function g which can be used to 
reveal the inner vectors and then using this knowledge to 
construct a message which will not be detected as a 
forgery by the integrity mechanism of EPBC. 
3.1 Mitchell’s analysis of function g 
This stage aims to use knowledge of a series of plaintext 
and ciphertext pairs to disclose the inner vectors,
iG . 
Knowledge of
iG permits a forgery attack on EPBC mode. 
The process of constructing a forged ciphertext is 
outlined in Sect. 4. 
    Properties of the function g are used to reveal the 
contents of the inner vectors
iG . Suppose X is an n -bit 
block, where X L R , 
1 2( , ,..., )mL x x x  and
1 2( , ,..., )m m m mR x x x   . Also, suppose 
' '( )g X L R  
where ' ' ' '
1 2( , ,..., )mL x x x and
' ' ' '
1 2( , ,..., )m m m mR x x x   . 
Because g applies bitwise operations to the two m -bit 
halves ( L and R ) of each block, it can be treated asm
parallel operations on pairs of bits ( ,j j mx x  ), where jx is 
the j -th bit of the block and j mx  is the ( j m )-th bit of 
the block, for 1,...,j m . Table 1 (modified from 
(Mitchell, 2007)) shows the set B of possible output pairs 
(
' ',j j mx x  ) that can be obtained after applying g to each 
possible set A of input pairs ( ,j j mx x  ). Sets in column A 
are grouped by the number of alternatives in each set. We 
will explain later why we have separated group 2 into 
subsets 2a  and 2b . 
Assume that a set of staggered plaintext/ciphertext 
blocks 1 2 3( , ),( , ),...i i i iC P C P    are known by the attacker. 
Assume also ( ,j j mx x  ) is a bit pair in inner vector 1iG  , 
where j  1 j m  is a randomly chosen bit position in 
an n -bit block. There are four possible values for this bit 
pair (listed as group 4 in Table 1). Mitchell (2007) notes 
that the set of output bit pairs from the function g can 
never include the specific bit pair (0, 1). Thus, the pair in 
position ( ,j j mx x  ) of  1ig G  can only take one of the 
values listed (for group 4) in column B of Table 1. 
Because of this, we can also narrow possible bit pairs in 
position ( ,j j mx x  ) in  1 1 1i i i iG P C g G      from four 
to three, where the bits in position ( ,j j mx x  ) of 1i iC P
determine which set of three pairs is relevant in each 
individual case. Similarly, when 
1iG   runs through the 
function g , either three (50% chance) or two (50% 
chance) alternatives result for the bit pairs in position  
( ,j j mx x  ) in  1ig G  .  
 
Table 1: Input/output possibilities for the function g 
(Mitchell, 2007, modified) 
If the bit pair in position ( ,j j mx x  ) of  1ig G  has two 
alternatives, so will the bit pair in this position in
 3 3 2 1i i i iG P C g G      .  Mitchell (2007) argues that 
the output bit pairs in  3ig G  will then either have two 
alternatives (5/6 chance) or one alternative (1/6 chance). 
Finally, if there is one alternative in the input, the output 
pairs of the function g have only one alternative. 
According to this argument, the   possible alternatives for 
each bit pair in 2 1i vG   will eventually be reduced to a 
single (known) alternative if sufficiently many staggered 
plaintext/ciphertext pairs 1 2 2 2 1( , ),..., ( , )i i i v i vC P C P     are 
known. 
    Based on Table 1, Mitchell (2007) proposed a matrix 
(shown in Figure 3) for the probability of transitions 
between the different groups in Table 1. The entries in 
row i and column j in the matrix denote the probability 
that there are j possible output bit pairs from the function
g , given that there were i possible input bit pairs. For 
example, for a set of three input bit pairs (3rd row) the 
output will be either three bit pairs (3rd column) with 50% 
chance or two bit pairs (2nd column) with 50% chance.  
 
Figure 3: Mitchell’s transition probability matrix 
(Mitchell 2007) 
If we iterate the above matrix v times, the bottom left 
entry of the resulting power matrix give us the probability 
of obtaining a single pair of bits as the possible output of
g after v iterations (Mitchell 2007). Note that v also 
indicates the number of staggered plaintext/ciphertext 
pairs required to iterate this analysis v times. 
Using this approach, Mitchell calculated the probability 
of knowing a single pair of bits and the corresponding 
probability of revealing a whole 128-bit block for various 
values of v . We present this information in Table 2; here
p  denotes the probability of a unique possibility for a 
single bit pair and q  denotes the probability of a unique 
possibility for a 128-bit block. For instance, with 
knowledge of 30 staggered pairs of plaintext/ciphertext 
blocks, there is a 99% chance that a bit pair will be 
known.  
    Mitchell used this theory to launch an attack. We 
discuss the methodology in section 4.  
 
Table 2: Probability of a unique possibility for a bit 
pair and a 128-bit block (Mitchell 2007) 
3.2 The flaw in Mitchell’s analysis 
Determining the inner vectors (
iF and iG ) is critical to the 
success of Mitchell’s forgery attack. We reviewed his 
process for obtaining the inner vectors and found that this 
process cannot uniquely determine the inner vectors of 
EPBC. Two alternatives remain for every pair of inner 
vectors. For example, this gives 642 alternatives for a 128-
bit block cipher. 
    The thick line in Table 1 divides the input/output 
possibilities for g into two separate groups. We consider 
specifically the cases where there are two possible input 
pairs, and divide this into groups: 2a and 2b . Note that it 
is not possible to obtain an input set in group 2a  as the 
output from applying g to any of the sets in group 2b . 
Recall that  1 1 1i i i iG P C g G     ; thus, for any given 
bit position ( ,j j mx x  ) in 1iG  , the relevant pair in
1i iP C  must be XORed with each of the possible output 
pairs in  1ig G  . Now every set in group 2b consists of 
one pair in which the two bits are identical and one pair in 
which the two bits are different. Regardless of which set 
we choose from group 2b and which bit pair is XORed to 
both of these, the resulting set of bit pairs will have the 
same property and must therefore belong to group 2b as 
well. Therefore the possibilities which are above the 
splitting line are as far as we can achieve. Thus, in this 
attack, for every pair of bits, instead of four alternatives 
we can have two (from group 2b ). The remaining groups 
in Table 1 are not accessible.  
    From Table 1, we develop a new theoretical transition 
probability matrix, as shown in Figure 4. The entry in the 
i row and the j column of this matrix denotes the 
probability that the number of input pairs i will generate 
the number of output pairs j . The labels 2a  and 2b  in 
the matrix relate to the two rows below the thick line and 
the four rows above the thick line in Table 1.  
 
Figure 4: Theoretical transition probability matrix 
    Although it is not possible to uniquely determine the 
inner vectors 
iF and iG , we can reduce the number of 
possible values for each inner vector. For example, for a 
128-bit block cipher, the number of possible values can 
be reduced from 644 alternatives to 642 alternatives. The 
chance of guessing the whole final inner vector correctly 
is now 642 . Although this is low it is dramatically better 
than the probability of guessing the entire block ( 1282 ). 
    By iterating the corrected matrix (Figure 4) v times, the 
(4, 2b ) entry of the resulting power matrix gives the 
probability p of obtaining two alternatives as the possible 
output of g after v iterations. This probability can then be 
used to determine the corresponding probability q that 
an n -bit block has only
/22n alternatives. Table 3 lists the 
values of p  and q for chosen values of v and n =128. For 
example, after 10 iterations, the probability p  that there 
are two alternatives remaining for a bit pair is 99%; for a 
complete block of 128 bits, the probability q that there 
are only two alternatives for each pair is 88%.  
 
Table 3: Probability of two alternatives for a bit pair 
and for every pair in a 128-bit block 
4 Mitchell’s Forgery Attack 
Based on his analysis, Mitchell (2007) explains how a 
forged ciphertext message can be derived by controlled 
deletion of blocks in a legitimate ciphertext message. 
Assume the attacker has obtained the values for two of 
the inner vectors
iG . Blocks can be deleted anywhere 
between the first ciphertext block and the second last 
ciphertext block. The ciphertext block after the deleted 
blocks must be modified to permit recovery of the correct 
inner vectors for the decryption process of the following 
ciphertext block. This ensures that the decrypted ICV 
value remains unchanged (Zuquete and Guedes 1997). 
For details of the construction, refer to Mitchell’s paper. 
4.1 Attack application 
We demonstrate this attack for a seven block ciphertext 
1 2 7, ,...,C C C . Assume that the inner vectors 3G and 5G are 
known and that the final plaintext block,
7P , is the ICV. 
Following Mitchell’s process, we constructed a forged 
ciphertext by deleting ciphertext blocks 
4C  and 5C , 
modifying 
6C  and leaving 7C  unchanged. After 
decryption, the forged ciphertext * *
1 2 3 4 5, , , ,C C C C C  
generates the correct value for the ICV. This forgery 
attack has been demonstrated for a specific example by 
coding it in C programming language, using AES with a 
block length of 128 bits. 
4.2 Success rate of revised attack 
Mitchell claimed that with the knowledge of over 100 
consecutive plaintext/ciphertext blocks ( v >50), the inner 
vectors
iG  would be revealed with very high probability 
(Mitchell 2007). However, as we showed in Sect. 3.2, the 
number of possible values for each inner vector 
iG  can 
only be reduced to 642 alternatives. The deletion attack 
described above requires two
iG values to be known. 
Therefore the probability of a successful forgery 
following this method is 1282 . This contradicts 
Mitchell’s claim that the forgery is guaranteed to succeed. 
Therefore Mitchell’s attack is no better than making 
random changes to the ciphertext (insertion, deletion or 
substitution) and hoping that the final block decrypts to 
give the correct ICV. 
    If the length of the ICV is l bits, then the probability of 
successful brute force attack on the ICV is 2 l . If l <128 
bits then this approach has higher success probability than 
Mitchell’s forgery attack. 
4.3 Comparison with key recovery attacks 
Recall that EPBC uses two keys, 'K and K . Suppose we 
use a cipher with a block length and a key size both of 
128 bits. Key 'K is used to firstly encrypt a sequence 
number S to obtain
0F , and then encrypt 0F  to obtain 0G . 
Key K  is used to encrypt 
iG  to obtain iF  for each 
message block. We compare Mitchell’s attack against 
exhaustive search on either or both keys. 
    Suppose S is known to the public and that a number of 
pairs of plaintext/ciphertext blocks are known to the 
attacker. Then it can be shown that exhaustive search on 
both keys requires 2562  guesses. Checking each of these 
guesses will require at least one decryption, so the 
complexity will be around 2562 . Knowing both 'K and K
allows the attacker to decrypt all ciphertext messages and 
impersonate either sender or receiver to communicate 
with the other one. 
    Now consider the key 'K . If this key and at least the 
first two plaintext/ciphertext pairs are known to the 
attacker, the relevant inner vectors can be revealed and a 
forgery attack conducted following Mitchell’s process. 
The probability of guessing this key correctly is 1282 . 
The correctness of the guess is verified by the receiver 
accepting the forged message. 
    Finally, consider the key K . If the attacker knows 
three consecutive plaintext/ciphertext pairs, it can be 
shown that this key and the inner vectors for these blocks 
can be revealed with a complexity of roughly 2312  
encryption/ decryption operations. The knowledge of key
K and these inner vectors guarantees the success of a 
forgery attack. 
5 Conclusion 
We reviewed Mitchell’s forgery attack on EPBC and 
found a flaw in his estimation of the probabilities of 
correctly obtaining the inner vectors. Knowledge of these 
inner vectors allows a forgery to be constructed. We show 
that, regardless of the number of known plaintext/ 
ciphertext blocks, the possible values for each inner 
vector can only be reduced to two alternatives per bit 
pair, rather than being uniquely determined as claimed by 
Mitchell. When the block length of the underlying cipher 
is 128 bits, the number of alternatives is reduced from 
1282  to 642 . The success rate of Mitchell’s forgery attack 
is therefore 1282 . This is no better than a brute force 
attack on the ICV, and worse if the length of the ICV is 
less than 128 bits. If the block cipher has a 128-bit key 
this is also comparable to exhaustive search on the key 
'K . For all of these attacks, the attacker does not know 
whether the modified ciphertext will be accepted before 
sending it. 
    Alternatively, the attacker can construct a forged 
ciphertext that is guaranteed to be accepted if either the 
second key K  or both keys are known. However the 
calculation complexity of finding these keys is 
prohibitive ( 2312  for finding K  and 2562  for finding both 
keys). 
    Our results indicate that EPBC is in fact secure against 
Mitchell’s forgery attack. Additionally, we recommend 
that the ICV should be no shorter than the block length, to 
reduce the success rate of brute force attacks on the ICV. 
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